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1 The background to reform
The Draft Consumer Protection Bill, recently published by the
Department of Trade and Industry,1 encapsulates a vision for a ‘‘new
consumer law’’,2 which has as its objective the establishment of ‘‘a fair,
accessible and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and
services’’.3 The cultural change necessary to address South Africa’s lack
of ‘‘a vibrant and strong consumer movement’’4 requires to be under-
pinned by legal certainty and accessibility. This is particularly important
in areas of liability ‘‘characterised by imbalances in information and
bargaining power between businesses and consumers’’.5 An important
dimension to the proposed reform is therefore the creation of a strict
liability framework to provide redress for consumers who have suffered
harm due to defects in products. Until now, a consumer who was injured
or who sustained property damage because of a safety defect in a product
obtained redress from the producer or distributor only where it could be
proved that the latter was at fault. Only three years ago, the Supreme
Court of Appeal confirmed the fault requirement in relation to the
manufacture, sale or distribution of goods and concluded that ‘‘if strict
liability is to be imposed it is the legislature that must do it’’.6 In section
* The authors wish to record their thanks to the British Council and the Association of Commonwealth
Universities who awarded them a Grant for International Collaboration to support work on this
project; as well as to the University of Stellenbosch for a research grant; and to Anita Moolman, who
rendered valuable research assistance to the project.
1 At http://www.dti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/DraftConsumerProtectionBill.htm.
2 As originally unveiled by the Department of Trade and Industry in its 2004 Green Paper on the
Consumer Policy Framework (at http://www.dti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/conslawreview.htm).
3 Preamble to the Bill.
4 Green Paper 7.
5 Green Paper par 1.3. On the need to modernise consumer law in order to maintain consumer confidence
see, eg, the UK White Paper Modern Market: Confident Consumers (1999) esp ch 6 at http://
www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/pdf1/consumerwp1999.pdf.
6 Wagener & Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 4 SA 285 (SCA) per Howie JA par 38.
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71 of the Bill, South Africa institutes a strict liability framework for
compensation.
With the introduction of strict liability for products, South Africa will
be brought into line with many other jurisdictions in the developed and
developing world.7 Whereas products liability was previously not
regarded as a discrete category, the trend towards making separate
provision gathered pace in the second half of the 20th century, reflecting
an increased interest in broadening access to justice for consumers. In the
1960s, the American Restatement (Second) of Torts } 402A, provided the
model for a distinct body of rules imposing liability on producers without
subjecting the consumer to the exacting requirement of proving that the
manufacturer was at fault.8 Following the Restatement lead, many
jurisdictions moved in the direction of strict, or stricter, forms of liability
specifically for products. A landmark was reached in 1985 with the EC
Directive on Product Liability9 in implementation of which the member
States of the European Union have introduced statutory frameworks for
strict liability. This has been used extensively as a model, for example in
the relevant sections of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, in the
Pacific Rim generally, and in Latin America.10 Meanwhile, in the United
States, the continuing debate as to the appropriate level of liability for
products culminated in } 2 of the 1998 US Restatement Third, Torts:
Products Liability, which in effect combines a strict liability regime for
certain types of product defect and fault-based liability for others. These
developments form the background to analysis of the proposed South
African legislation.
The framework chosen for South Africa appears to follow closely the
European Directive. A strict liability regime is adopted, which makes no
overt mention of fault, and indeed much of the wording appears to derive
from the Directive and the UK Consumer Protection Act, 1987 based
upon it. Given, however, that the experience of consumers in Europe, 20
years after the Directive, has been mixed, the essential question is whether
the draft South African provisions can achieve their stated goal of
establishing an effective system of redress for consumers.11
7 See the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, adopted in 1985 by Resolution 39/85
(available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption en.pdf). The Guidelines aim to
achieve adequate protection for consumers in all countries, ‘‘recognizing that consumers often face
imbalances in economic terms, educational levels and bargaining power; and bearing in mind that
consumers should have the right of access to non-hazardous products’’. There are many dimensions to
the legal protection envisaged, but two of the prime objectives are ‘‘the protection of consumers from
hazards to their health and safety’’ and ‘‘the promotion and protection of the economic interests of
consumers’’.
8 For a comparison of European and Anglo-American perspectives on product liability prior to the
1960s, see Whittaker Liability for Products (2005) 5-6.
9 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ 1985
L210/29.
10 For an overview of international developments see Reimann ‘‘Liability for Defective Products at the
Beginning of the Twenty-first Century’’ 2003 51 AmJCompL 751 756 et seq.
11 S 3 of the Bill.
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2 What kind of liability is provided for?
Section 71(1) of the Bill provides that:
‘‘Any producer, distributor or supplier of a good is strictly liable for any damage, as described
in subsection (2), caused wholly or partly as a consequence of a product failure, defect or
hazard in a good, or as a result of inadequate instructions or warnings provided to the
consumer, and if in a particular case, more than one person is liable in terms of this subsection,
their liability is joint and several.’’
A ‘‘defect’’ is defined in section 1 as
‘‘any characteristic of a good, component of a good, or aspect of a service supplied to a
consumer, that renders the good, component, or service less useful, practicable or safe than
persons generally are entitled to expect, having regard to the circumstances of the transaction’’.
Thus the liability of producers, distributors and suppliers towards
persons suffering damage as a result of a product failure or defect is
clearly not limited to parties in a contractual relationship, and section
71(1) utilises concepts associated with the law of delict, albeit not
exclusively; such as strict liability, damage, causation and joint and
several liability. To be properly understood in the context of this section,
these concepts require analysis in terms of the common law, in particular
the law of delict, as discussed further below.
Most jurisdictions now regard product liability as a discrete area of
delict or tort. The law of contract governs only actions by a purchaser in
a direct contractual relationship with a producer or distributor.12 The
move from contract to tort in American product liability cases has been
described as follows by Traynor J in Greenman v Yuba Power Products
Inc:13
‘‘A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being. Recognised first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has
now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if
defective. Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an
express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment
of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed
by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the
scope of its own responsibility for defective products make clear that the liability is not one
governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly,
rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial
transactions cannot be invoked to govern the manufacturer’s liability to those injured by their
defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is
imposed.’’
An action in delict thus ‘‘short-circuits’’ the need for successive actions
for breach of contract by the consumer against the retailer; the retailer
against the wholesaler, and so on. The action in delict also obviates the
12 Reimann ‘‘Product Liability in a Global Context: The Hollow Victory of the European Model’’ 2003 2
European Review of Private Law 128 144.
13 377 P 2d 897 (1963) 901.
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need for the plaintiff to have acquired title of the product or to show
reliance on the warranty of safety.
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Wagener v
Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd14 effectively ruled out the
development of common law strict liability rules by the courts, but took
careful account of the debate on strict liability in academic literature and
said of the arguments in favour ‘‘that virtually without exception they
would hold good were imposition to be by the legislature’’. The court
indicated that legislation would be needed to produce a unified,
comprehensive set of principles, rules and procedures for product
liability, in contrast to an incremental, case-by-case development of such
liability by the courts. The court noted that such reforming legislation
would need to deal with issues such as the kind of products that would
give rise to liability, the definition of defectiveness, the causing of harm
by a combined use of products, the defences that should be available, and
whether the damages recoverable should be the same as those recoverable
with an Aquilian action.15
The essential questions posed by section 71 and related sections of the
Consumer Protection Bill are therefore whether they create a compre-
hensive and logically coherent set of rules for strict product liability, as
envisaged in the Wagener judgment; whether such rules are successfully
grafted onto the South African law of delict; and whether the rules serve
to promote the policy considerations underlying strict product liability.
3 What are the policy considerations underlying strict liability?
No-fault liability of manufacturers or suppliers for harm resulting from
defectively manufactured products, as set out in the Bill, rests on
considerations of fairness and economic efficiency. The Preamble to the
European Product Liability Directive states that
‘‘liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the
problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks
inherent in modern technological production. . .’’.
The arguments supporting this assertion are not considered in detail
here, but the aspiration of achieving a fair apportionment of risk is
essential background to the interpretation of the proposed legislation.
The ultimate consumer is normally unable to analyse or scrutinise
products for safety, and implicitly takes it on trust that a product will not
endanger life, health or property. In many cases manufacturing defects
are in fact caused by the manufacturer’s negligence, but plaintiffs have
difficulty proving it. Strict liability therefore comes to the aid of
consumers harmed by defective products where proof of negligence
14 2004 4 SA 285 (SCA).
15 Pars 30-35 of the judgment.
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would be difficult or impossible.16 The basic utilitarian or efficiency-
based argument for strict liability is that
‘‘the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a
position to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when they
do occur. . .’’.17
The manufacturer and other businesses forming part of the product
supply chain can spread the costs of improved quality and safety control,
either through insurance or through increased prices:
‘‘The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.’’18
Apart from the ‘‘down-stream’’, corrective or compensatory function
of strict liability for defective products there is also an ‘‘up-stream’’,
preventative or deterrence function. In the USA, product liability
litigation is seen as a powerful means to induce product safety, whereas
in many other jurisdictions product safety is regarded as belonging
primarily in the domain of public regulation.19 The comment on the
Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability refers to the premise that
tort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety incentives.
Imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm caused by manu-
facturing defects encourages greater investment in product safety than
does a regime of fault-based liability under which sellers may escape their
appropriate share of responsibility.
It should be acknowledged, however, that strict liability might not
always achieve optimal economic efficiency. Some risks are unavoidable,
particularly those arising from hidden design defects. A strict liability
regime that holds the manufacturer automatically liable for harm
resulting from defects might lead to manufacturers taking excessive
precautions, pushing prices up beyond the level which reflects the
potential costs to society of product defects, or driving producers out of
the market. Also, product innovation may be inhibited by the threat of
high damages awards based on strict liability.20 Furthermore, from an
insurance point of view, manufacturers are not always best placed to
assess particular risks and to take out appropriate third-party insur-
ance.21 As far as physical damage to property is concerned, the consumer,
who has more information about the value of the property and the uses
16 US Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability } 2 comment (a).
17 Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc 161 A 2d 69 (1960) 81.
18 Per Traynor J in Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Fresno 150 P 2d 436 (1944) 440.
19 Reimann 2003 2 European Review of Private Law 152-153. On the function of special product liability
rules see generally Grubb (series ed) Howells (gen ed) Butterworths Common Law Series: The Law of
Product Liability (2000) pars 1.25-1.33.
20 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law 5 ed (2003) 620; Hodges
‘‘Development Risks: Unanswered Questions’’ 1998 61 MLR 560.
21 See generally Stapleton Product Liability (1994) ch 5.
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to which it is put, may be in a better position to take out insurance
covering the potential loss (although first-party or loss insurance is
probably beyond the reach of many of the South African consumers
whom this statute is designed to protect).
The debate on the policy considerations underlying strict product
liability focuses to a large extent on the concept of reasonableness.
Can the imposition of strict product liability be said to be fair and
equitable if it disregards the reasonable foreseeability of harm? Under
a fault-based system the negligence requirement, based mainly on the
reasonable foreseeability of harm, acts as an important filter in the
evaluative process to decide whether liability should be imposed.
Would the elimination of the fault requirement mean that the
fundamental requirement of reasonableness is discarded and that all
risk of harm is indiscriminately transferred to manufacturers or
suppliers? The answer is no: strict liability does not mean absolute
liability and other filters for liability, based on reasonableness, should
remain in place.
The argument made here is essentially that the criterion of ‘‘defective-
ness’’ for the purposes of strict product liability should be linked to the
requirement of wrongfulness, as understood in the South African law of
delict. No-fault product liability still requires an assessment of
wrongfulness, focusing on the qualities of the product, with reference
to factors such as the potential for harm, benefits, costs and social utility
of the product, in a process sometimes called ‘‘risk-utility balancing’’.
Society does not benefit from products that are excessively safe — for
example, knives with blunt edges or cars designed with maximum speeds
of 30 kilometres per hour — any more than it benefits from products that
are too dangerous. Society benefits most when the optimal or reasonable
standard of product safety is achieved. The setting of this standard
essentially involves the element of wrongfulness.
In the context of product liability not only the characteristics of the
product but also consumer behaviour should be tested according to a
standard of reasonableness. It is fair to require that individual consumers
bear reasonable responsibility for proper use of products. This prevents
careless consumers from being subsidised by more careful ones, when the
former are paid damages out of funds to which the latter are forced to
contribute through higher prices.
4 The appropriateness of reform to the existing structure of the
law
In the interest of legal certainty and logical coherence, the reform of
the current fault-based delictual liability for defective products, as
envisaged in the Consumer Protection Bill, should be as consistent as
possible with the existing structure of the law, in particular the law of
delict. The South African law of delict recognises wrongfulness and fault
as separate elements of delict. The nature of and distinction between
LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS 417
these elements may be contentious in certain aspects,22 but there is broad
agreement on the distinct requirements of wrongfulness and fault. In the
context of product liability, fault essentially means negligence, because
there is mostly no question of intentional causing of harm.
In Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd,23 a case
where harm was caused to patients by a defective local anaesthetic
(Regibloc), the elements of wrongfulness and negligence were distin-
guished as follows:
‘‘In deciding the issues raised by the appeal it must be accepted, as regards the facts, that the
Regibloc in question was manufactured by the respondent, that it was defective when it left the
respondent’s control, that it was administered in accordance with the respondent’s
accompanying instructions, that it was its defective condition which caused the alleged harm
and that such harm was reasonably foreseeable. It must also be accepted, as far as the law is
concerned, indeed it was not disputed, firstly, that the respondent, as manufacturer, although
under no contractual obligation to the appellant, was under a legal duty in delictual law to
avoid reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from defectively manufactured Regibloc being
administered to the first appellant and, secondly, that that duty was breached. In the situation
pleaded there would therefore clearly have been unlawful conduct on the part of the
respondent: Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd.24 The essential enquiry is
whether liability attaches even if the breach occurred without fault on the respondent’s part.’’
The court thus accepted that the manufacturer had wrongfully caused
the harm to patients by selling products not conforming to its own
specifications, in other words, products with a manufacturing defect.
Liability could have been imposed had proof of negligence not been
required
If the fault requirement for product liability is discarded, as intended
by the Bill, the plaintiff would need to prove that; (1) a product (2) that is
defective (3) caused (4) damage or harm (5) wrongfully. The requirements
of defectiveness and wrongfulness are linked, because damage or harm
resulting from the use of a product is not necessarily wrongfully caused
— the concept of ‘‘defectiveness’’ plays a normative and limiting role in
the process of determining whether the causing of harm by the
manufacturing and supply of a product should be considered wrongful.
This linkage between the concepts of wrongfulness and defectiveness in
the context of product liability will now be examined in detail.
4 1 Wrongfulness in the SA law of delict
The test for wrongfulness involves application of the standards of
‘‘legal convictions of the community’’ or the boni mores. This is generally
recognised to be a hindsight-test — an ex post facto assessment of all the
facts and a balancing of the interests involved, to determine whether the
causing of harm unreasonably infringes the rights or interests of the
plaintiff, or constitutes an unreasonable breach of duty on the part of the
22 See generally Fagan Negligence in Zimmermann, Visser & Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in
Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in South Africa and Scotland (2004) 498.
23 2004 4 SA 285 (SCA) per Howie P par 7.
24 2002 2 SA 447 (SCA) (footnote added).
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defendant. The nature of that duty may be different according to whether
the liability is fault-based or strict.25
In the context of product liability, the focus is on the existence of a
duty not to cause harm to a consumer by the manufacture or supply of a
defective product. Here wrongfulness essentially involves the question
whether the defendant unreasonably caused harm to a consumer and,
secondly, whether the law of delict should intervene.26 To answer the
general policy question whether the law of delict should intervene, with
the effect of shifting the burden of harm from the plaintiff to the
defendant, regard is had to a wide spectrum of considerations, including
whether intervention by the law of delict could result in ‘‘opening the
floodgates of liability’’.
Wrongfulness in the context of product liability is closely linked to the
question of defectiveness, because the causing of harm is not always
necessarily wrongful in itself — the concept of a ‘‘defective product’’
plays a normative role in the process of determining whether the harm
resulting from the manufacturing and supply of a product should be
considered wrongful.
In Herschel v Mrupe,27 Van den Heever JA stated that harm caused by
a defective product involved the infringement of the rights of the user and
a breach of duty by the manufacturer:
‘‘By putting into circulation potentially harmful things. . .the manufacturer is not merely
exercising a legal right but encroaching upon the rights of others not to be exposed, when going
about their lawful occasions and when accepting the implied general invitation to acquire and
use such commodities, to danger without warning and without their having a reasonable
opportunity to become aware of such danger before use. In other words, it is an encroachment
upon the rights of others to set hidden snares for them in the exercise of their own rights. To
refrain from doing so is a duty owing to the world at large.’’
And in Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd,28 the court
characterised the causing of damage to a consumer by a ‘‘hazardous’’
product as wrongful:
‘‘If a manufacturer produces and markets a product without conclusive prior tests, when the
utilisation thereof in the recommended manner is potentially hazardous to the consumer, such
negligence on the part of the manufacturer may expose him to delictual liability to the
consumer. . .Although the historical origin of the manufacturer’s liability is an agreement
between the manufacturer and the distributor, the liability, which arises from the manufacture
and distribution of the product, extends via the other contracting party to any third party who
utilises the product in the prescribed manner and suffers damage as a result thereof. It follows
as a matter of course that a manufacturer who distributes a product commercially, which, in
the course of its intended use, and as the result of a defect, causes damage to the consumer
thereof, acts wrongly and thus unlawfully according to the legal convictions of the
community.’’
25 For a recent discussion of the nature of the duty when liability is based on negligence whether the
duty should be described as a duty not to be negligent see Fagan Negligence 508.
26 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict 5 ed (2006) 34.
27 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 486F.
28 2002 2 SA 447 (SCA) pars 64 470B-C/D and 66 D/E-G.
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What do the standards of ‘‘the legal convictions of the community’’ or
boni mores mean? These standards have been applied in a long line of
cases by the Supreme Court of Appeal and have been usefully
summarised in a few recent judgments.
In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund,29 the (admittedly quite different)
question before the court was whether the right to support of one partner
in a same-sex relationship could form the basis of a claim for loss of
support against the person who negligently caused the death of the other
partner, or, put differently, whether the killing of the deceased had to be
considered to have been a wrongful act as against the plaintiff. The court
held that the question had to be answered in the light of the prevailing
boni mores. The legal convictions of the community were informed by the
norms and values of society as embodied in the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which norms and values in
this case indicated a wrongful infringement of the plaintiff’s right to
support.30
In another recent case, Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton,31
the court referred back to the formulation in Van Eeden v Minister of
Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae)32 to
assess the wrongfulness or otherwise of an omission or failure to act:
‘‘[9] . . .An omission is wrongful if the defendant is under a legal duty to act positively to
prevent the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The test is one of reasonableness. A defendant is
under a legal duty to act positively to prevent harm to the plaintiff if it is reasonable to expect
of the defendant to have taken positive measures to prevent the harm. The Court determines
whether it is reasonable to have expected of the defendant to have done so by making a value
judgment based, inter alia, upon its perception of the legal convictions of the community and
on considerations of policy. The question whether a legal duty exists in a particular case is thus
a conclusion of law depending on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case and on
the interplay of the many factors which have to be considered.
[10] In applying the concept of the legal convictions of the community the Court is not
concerned with what the community regards as socially, morally, ethically or religiously right
or wrong, but whether or not the community regards a particular act or form of conduct as
delictually wrongful. The legal convictions of the community must further be seen as the legal
convictions of the legal policy makers of the community, such as the Legislature and Judges.’’
The concepts of ‘‘the legal convictions of the community’’ and boni
mores purport to be objective, normative standards for determining
wrongfulness, but conclusions reached on the basis of these standards
alone would be impenetrable to analysis and unverifiable. Courts do not
hear evidence on the content of the legal convictions of the community or
the boni mores. These are general standards or guidelines used by the
29 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA).
30 Pars 17, 18 368E-F and 369A/B-C.
31 2004 2 SA 216 (SCA) par 16.
32 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) per Kriegler J. Similar factors are noted in the discussion of wrongfulness in
Midgley & Van der Walt Delict in LAWSA VIII part 1 first re-issue par 51, which concludes: ‘‘It is
now openly acknowledged that the enquiry into wrongfulness involves considerations of public and
legal policy and that courts are required to render a value judgment as to what society’s notion of
justice demands, either to protect the plaintiff’s interests or to give judicial sanction to the defendant’s
conduct.’’
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courts to assess reasonableness in the particular circumstances of the
case, with the perspective of hindsight. Wrongfulness in the final analysis
involves a value judgment, reached by (what should be) an open and
structured process of reasoning, by reference to the proven facts; the
relationship between the parties; the relevant policy considerations; the
relevant provisions of the Constitution and of other legislation; the
overall costs; the risks and utility of the defendant’s conduct; and the
possible alternatives to such conduct.33
4 2 Defectiveness and wrongfulness linked
As noted above, the concepts of defectiveness and wrongfulness are
linked in that defectiveness plays a normative and limiting role in
determining whether the causing of harm should be considered wrongful.
It follows that defectiveness should be assessed in terms of the same
general standards — in other words, the legal convictions of the
community, boni mores and general reasonableness, as applied to the
nature and qualities of the product and in particular its risks and benefits.
To date the South African law of delict has not developed detailed
rules for different forms of product defects (manufacturing defects,
design defects, or defects which derive from inadequate instructions or
warnings issued with a product) and the courts apply the general
principles relating to wrongfulness in this regard. Some commentators
have interpreted the approach of the courts to mean that a product will
be considered defective and damage to be wrongfully caused if the
product is unreasonably dangerous. Van der Merwe & De Jager34 have
said the following on the application of the wrongfulness test in this
regard:
‘‘The test is flexible enough to take into account such factors as the type of product, the nature
of the manufacturer’s business enterprise, the customs and practices prevailing in a particular
trade or industry, the amount of knowledge and expertise of potential purchasers and users of
the product, abnormal use, and the specific stage in the production process during which a
defect originated. The last mentioned factor may influence the duties of a manufacturer in
different ways. At the stage of planning or design the manufacturer must take into account the
most recent knowledge available in his field.’’
4 3 Wrongfulness and negligence distinguished
Wrongfulness and negligence are, however, recognised as separate
elements of delict. Boberg35 explained the ‘‘distinction between reason-
ableness as a criterion of wrongfulness and reasonableness as a criterion
of negligence’’ as follows:
33 See, eg, Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA) par 7; Cape Town
Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) pars 14-32; Cape Metropolitan Council v Graham 2001
1 SA 1197 (SCA) par 6; Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA) pars 11
and 31; BOE Bank Ltd v Ries 2002 2 SA 39 (SCA) par 13.
34 ‘‘Products Liability: A Recent Unreported Case’’ 1980 SALJ 83 88.
35 The Law of Delict I (1984) 269-270 and see also 33 38-40 273 and 381.
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‘‘Where wrongfulness is in issue, the question is whether it was objectively unreasonable for the
actor to bring about the consequence that he did, judged ex post facto and in the light of all
relevant circumstances including those not foreseeable by the actor or beyond his control. Here
the emphasis is upon the effect of the actor’s conduct, and a finding of wrongfulness expresses
the law’s disapproval of the result that he produced. With negligence, on the other hand, the
enquiry is whether the actor himself behaved unreasonably, judged in the light of his actual
situation and what he ought to have foreseen and done in the circumstances that confronted
him. Here the emphasis is upon the actor’s role in bringing about a consequence that has
already been branded wrongful, and a finding of negligence expresses the law’s disapproval of
the part that he personally played in producing it.’’
Negligence entails the duty ‘‘to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm’’
and it is generally accepted that negligence involves a foresight-test: did
the defendant-producer in the process of production take reasonable care
to prevent foreseeable harm, in other words, did the producer conform to
the standard of a reasonable person to foresee and prevent harm? The
concepts of negligence and wrongfulness are essentially distinguished by a
difference in perspective.36 The test for negligence focuses on what is
reasonably foreseeable and preventable at the time when the product was
put on the market, whereas the test for wrongfulness and the linked
question of defectiveness of the product focus on all the circumstances
with hindsight, including the standard intended for the product by the
manufacturer and the risks and benefits of the product in the light of the
harm that it caused.
Under a fault-based system the negligence requirement acts as an
important filter in the evaluative process to decide whether liability
should be imposed. If the requirement of negligence is discarded to create
strict liability, the question whether the product defect was reasonably
foreseeable or discoverable is no longer relevant. In the assessment of
defects relating to manufacturing, design or warnings/instructions,
criteria such as ‘‘the standard intended for the product by the
manufacturer’’, ‘‘a reasonable alternative design’’ or ‘‘the provision of
reasonable alternative instructions or warnings’’ should be applied with
the knowledge of hindsight. The elimination of the fault requirement does
not, however, mean that all risk of harm is indiscriminately transferred to
manufacturers or suppliers. Strict liability does not mean absolute
liability, and other filters based on reasonableness remain in place, in the
form of the requirements of wrongfulness and ‘‘defectiveness’’. No-fault
product liability still requires an assessment of reasonableness, but it is
done with hindsight, involving a process sometimes referred to as ‘‘risk-
utility balancing’’.
This method of assessment can be illustrated by reference to other
areas of liability: if the question is whether a local authority is liable for
harm caused by public property in a state of disrepair, such as a
pedestrian’s injury resulting from a hole in a pavement,37 a child’s injury
36 See Fagan Negligence 527.
37 Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA).
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on a broken merry-go-round,38 or a shop-owner’s loss through flooding
from a burst pipe,39 the wrongfulness and the negligence issues both
involve consideration of the extent of the risk and of the possible harm,
the cost of repair and the resources available to the local authority.
However, wrongfulness will be assessed with knowledge of the state of
disrepair and the resultant harm gained by hindsight. If, with such
knowledge, repair would have been reasonable to expect, the failure to
prevent the harm indicates that it was wrongfully caused. Where the local
authority was unaware of the state of disrepair and could not reasonably
have foreseen it, perhaps owing to the informational and organisational
constraints under which it operates, the failure to repair and to prevent
the harm is not negligent, but, under a strict liability regime the local
authority will nevertheless be liable. Likewise, under a strict liability
regime there is liability for causing harm to an unforeseeable plaintiff,
whereas under a negligence-based regime there is no such liability.40
The relevance of these interrelated concepts of wrongfulness, defec-
tiveness and negligence to the proposed reform of products liability is
considered further below.
5 What is a ‘‘product failure, defect or hazard’’ according to the
Consumer Protection Bill?
The terms ‘‘product failure, defect or hazard’’ are not defined in the
Bill. The definition of ‘‘defect’’ in section 1 broadly follows the wording
of article 6 of the European Directive and closely follows the wording of
section 3 of the UK Consumer Protection Act. A ‘‘defect’’ is a
‘‘characteristic . . . that renders the good, component, or service less useful, practicable or safe
than persons generally are entitled to expect, having regard to the circumstances of the
transaction’’.
(There is also a cross reference in section 1 to section 58(4) and (5),
which is plainly incorrect in the current draft, but perhaps relates to
section 50(4) and (5) dealing with the form of notices for persons of
limited literacy or comprehension).
Furthermore, under the heading ‘‘General right to fair value, good
quality and safety’’, section 61(3) provides:
‘‘The consumer of any goods has a right to receive goods that are free of any product failure,
defect or hazard that would render the utility, practicability or safety of that good to be less
than persons are generally entitled to expect, having regard to all the circumstances of its
supply. . .’’.
The wording of section 61(3), like that of the definition of ‘‘defect’’ in
section 1, closely follows the wording of section 3(2) of the UK statute
(not so closely article 6 of the Directive). Defects are qualities which
38 Cape Town Municipality v April 1982 1 SA 259 (C).
39 Mostert v Cape Town City Council 2001 1 SA 105 (SCA).
40 Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v De Villiers 1949 1 SA 474 (C).
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render the safety of the product ‘‘less than persons are generally entitled
to expect having regard to all the circumstances of its supply, including
but not limited to’’ certain specific considerations. Three factors are then
listed, namely packaging and instructions; reasonably anticipated use;
and time when the good was manufactured and supplied. There is a
supplementary provision in section 61(4)(a) to the effect that the latent or
patent nature of the defect is irrelevant and in section 61(4)(b) to the
effect that the production of subsequent safer goods does not make older
goods unsafe (an example might be older cars which lack the airbags
fitted in newer models). In addition, section 61(5) contains the following
general direction:
‘‘A person must not produce or distribute an unsafe good, or knowingly supply such a good to
a consumer.’’
This final provision is puzzling: for its non-formulation of a right or
remedy; for its introduction of the apparently separate category of
‘‘unsafe good’’; and for prohibiting only the act of ‘‘knowingly’’
supplying such an ‘‘unsafe good’’, thereby creating, if anything, liability
only for intentional conduct. Similarly, a general good faith requirement
on producers, set out in section 4(4), not to engage in unconscionable or
misleading conduct, appears to add little in concrete terms to the
remedies available to consumers.
The apparent purpose of section 61 is to set out contractual rights as
between a ‘‘consumer’’ and ‘‘supplier’’ (both terms are defined in section
1), rather than general rules for strict liability outside a contractual
relationship. Its definition of ‘‘product failure, defect or hazard’’ is
substantially similar to the definition of ‘‘defect’’ in section 1 (thereby
redefining an already defined term), but in listing the three factors (noted
in the paragraph above), it elaborates on the circumstances to be taken
into account to determine such a failure. This elaboration is helpful for
giving more specific content to the circumstances relevant to assessing a
failure, defect or hazard related to the utility, practicability or safety of a
product.
Since the definition of ‘‘defect’’, turning on what ‘‘persons generally are
entitled to expect’’, broadly follows the wording of the European
Directive and closely follows that of section 3 of the UK Consumer
Protection Act, it is important to consider the European experience of
this ‘‘consumer expectations’’ or ‘‘legitimate expectations’’ approach to
determining defectiveness.
5 1 The consumer expectations test: a workable standard?
The application of the ‘‘consumer expectations’’ or ‘‘legitimate
expectations’’ test for defectiveness as prescribed in the Directive and
contained in the UK legislation, and as also used in some American
product liability cases, presents obvious difficulties. For instance, are
consumers entitled to expect more than the exercise of reasonable care,
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skill and knowledge? The test purports to be an objective, normative
standard for determining defectiveness, but in practice the courts conduct
an objective enquiry into the attributes, risks and benefits of a product
and, inevitably, the application of the consumer expectations test in the
final analysis involves a value judgment.
Prosser & Keeton41 are critical of the consumer expectations test as an
independent general standard for defectiveness:
‘‘The meaning is ambiguous and the test is very difficult of application to discrete problems.
What does the reasonable purchaser contemplate? In one sense he does not ‘‘expect’’ to be
adversely affected by a risk or hazard unknown to him. In another sense he does contemplate
the ‘‘possibility’’ of unknown ‘‘side effects’’. In a sense the ordinary purchaser cannot
reasonably expect anything more than that reasonable care in the exercise of the skill and
knowledge available to design engineers has been exercised. The test can be utilized to explain
most any result that a court or jury chooses to reach. The application of such a vague concept
in many situations does not provide much guidance for a jury.’’
Davis42 has identified the reasons why most US courts have rejected
the consumer expectations test, in particular where the alleged defect
relates to design:
‘‘Few courts adhere closely to the letter of section 402A’s consumer expectations test in proving
design defect. The test has proved unworkable for a variety of reasons. First, it connotes a
contract-based liability, encouraging the jury to rely intuitively on principles of bargaining and
warranty. Second, if the product contains a defect which is apparent or obvious, the consumer
expectations arguably include the apparent danger, preventing liability and therefore
discouraging product improvements which could easily and cost-effectively alleviate the
danger. Third, bystanders, who are widely recognized as protected by both tort and contract
theories of products liability regardless of privity, cannot be said to have any expectations
about a product which causes them injury.
Perhaps the most important criticism of the consumer expectations test
as it relates to design defects is the impossibility of the task it requires: to
define just what an ordinary consumer expects of the technical design
characteristics of a product.While it can be assumed that consumers expect
a certain level of safety, how is that level defined when it comes to specific
design criteria? For example, what do consumers expect of the structural
soundness of one type ofmetal as opposed to another with slightly different
characteristics that, if used, would require changes in still other aspects of
the design? If the ordinary consumer can be said reasonably to expect a
product to be ‘‘strong,’’ how strong is strong? Is a general impression of
strength or quality sufficient when it comes to technical design features? If
so, how is that impression measurable against the actual condition of the
design feature in question? These difficult questions led many courts to
reject the consumer expectations test as the sole test for defective design.’’
Stapleton,43 similarly, is critical of the consumer expectations test as a
41 The Law of Torts 5 ed (1984) 699 (footnote omitted).
42 ‘‘Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility’’ 1993 39 Wayne L Rev 1217 236-
237 (footnotes omitted).
43 ‘‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’’ 2000 39
Washburn LJ 363 376-378.
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normative standard, describing it as ‘‘impenetrable to analysis’’. It
cannot mean that the courts must somehow determine the actual
expectations of consumers generally. This would be a strange legal
standard to adopt. People routinely miscalculate risks and sometimes
people have an irrational expectation that nothing will or can go wrong.
A legal norm cannot coherently or fairly be based on such a volatile
standard. If it is accepted that the consumer expectations test means
that the courts should determine what consumers are entitled to expect,
the test is still unsatisfactory, because, as a normative concept, it cannot
be rationalised: one may simply assert that in one’s opinion the design
did not meet consumer expectations. As Stapleton points out, the
consumer expectations test in effect requires a subjective value judgment
by the court on what consumers are reasonably entitled to expect of a
product. The risk-utility test, on the other hand, requires a balancing of
certain ‘‘objective’’ factors, although in the end it comes down to the
identical value judgment: did the product present an unreasonable risk
to consumers?
Stapleton also shows that the difference between a hindsight
perspective and a foresight perspective is critical to the application
of the consumer expectations test in the case of an undiscoverable
product flaw. The Thalidomide cases in Europe illustrate that if the
level of safety of a product is assessed with hindsight according to
consumer expectations, the result is a foregone conclusion. Consumers
and the community generally clearly do not expect pregnancy drugs to
deform babies. The crucial issue is therefore the time at which the level
of safety of the product is to be assessed: at the time when it was
supplied, or at the time of trial when its egregiously harmful effects are
known?
5 2 The consumer expectations test: does it really entail strict liability?
Commentators on the European Directive have pointed out that the
language of strict liability which it contains is not followed through,
particularly in respect of design and warning or instruction defects.
Article 6 requires the reasonable expectations of the consumer to be
assessed in the light of ‘‘the use to which it could reasonably be
expected that the product would be put’’. The presentation of the
product is a further consideration, and this is expanded in section
3(2)(a) of the UK Consumer Protection Act to include, as in the South
African Bill,
‘‘the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been marketed, its get-up, the
use of any mark in relation to the product and any instructions for, or warnings with respect
to, doing or refraining from doing anything with or in relation to the product’’.
These phrases seem to indicate a negligence standard based upon the
reasonableness of the manufacturer’s design or warning choices (perhaps
based upon the rationale that a finding of defectiveness in design may
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force the manufacturer to change the product design or even to stop
supplying the product).44
The emphasis on what the consumer is ‘‘entitled’’ to expect, as opposed
to actual consumer expectations, draws the courts back to a standard of
reasonableness and the extent to which the conduct of the producer meets
reasonable expectations is often considered relevant. Factors such as the
costs of improving the safety of the product and any consequent loss in
utility are therefore taken into account. Moreover, article 6(c) expressly
provides that ‘‘the time when the product was put into circulation’’ is a
consideration in assessing whether it is defective, thus permitting
producers to escape liability by arguing that they have conformed to
industry standard practice, in other words that they were not negligent.
In addition, the European Directive allowed member States the option
of excluding the so-called ‘‘development risks’’ defence, so that the
producer is liable
‘‘even if he proves that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be
discovered’’.45
However, most European member States retained this defence (which
is also provided for in section 71(3)(c)(ii) of the Consumer Protection
Bill), with the consequence that producers were provided with another
means of escaping liability if they established absence in negligence in
their conduct. This defence is discussed further in paragraph 11 below.
In the United States, the Third Restatement distinguishes between
manufacturing, design and warning defects: a product is defective in
terms of } 2(a) when at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings. The definition of design and
warning defects in } 2(a) and } 2(b) refers to ‘‘foreseeable risks of harm’’;
‘‘a reasonable alternative design’’ and ‘‘the provision of reasonable
instructions or warning’’. The comment on these sections states that, in
relation to these designs and warning defects (as opposed to manufactur-
ing defects), the law has returned ‘‘to a reasonableness test traditionally
used in determining whether an actor has been negligent’’. This gradual
retreat to the terminology of fault in American product liability law may
be partly attributable to a desire to protect manufacturers, but it also
derives from the very nature of design, warning and instruction defects
that are almost impossible to define except in relative terms.46
It appears therefore that neither the US Third Restatement nor the
European Directive has entirely eliminated elements of fault-based
liability. This raises the question whether the proposed South African
44 Grubb (series ed) Howells (gen ed) Butterworths Common Law Series: The Law of Product Liability
(2000) 8.
45 Art 15(b).
46 See Reimann 2003 51 AmJCompL 778. On the tendency towards a risk/utility analysis see Stapleton
Product Liability 235-236.
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legislation, incorporating the consumer expectations test, does in reality
provide for strict liability, as it professes to do. Could a producer,
distributor or supplier evade strict liability if the design, warning or
instruction defect was not reasonably foreseeable?
5 3 The standard for determining a defect in section 71
The measures contained in the Bill fail in the key requirement of
achieving a workable standard for determining the defectiveness of a
product. Section 71 refers to a ‘‘product failure, defect or hazard’’, but
only ‘‘defect’’ is defined. As discussed above, the European and US
experience of the ‘‘consumer expectations’’ test adopted in this definition
has opened up worrying questions as to its application. Moreover, there
is a logical and necessary linkage between the standard for determining
defectiveness of a product and the requirement of wrongfulness in the
South African law of delict. In the absence of such a linkage there is no
clear distinction between a foresight and a hindsight approach to
establishing defectiveness; and a standard based on what persons
generally are entitled to expect may well re-introduce elements of
negligence, contrary to the stated aim of section 71 to introduce strict
product liability. The introduction of a new and apparently independent
standard, based on what ‘‘persons generally are entitled to expect’’,
creates uncertainty about the distinction, if any, between this standard
and the ‘‘legal convictions of the community’’ or boni mores standard for
determining wrongfulness.
For these reasons it cannot be said that the provisions on defectiveness
of products contained in the Bill constitute a logically coherent set of
rules that would effectively and consistently impose strict liability for
damage caused by defective products. Moreover, the standard which the
Bill purports to adopt cannot readily be grafted on to the principles of the
South African law of delict.
What should be done? It is suggested that the definition of ‘‘defect’’
should be amended to do away with the ‘‘consumer expectations’’ test for
defectiveness and to provide instead for the assessment of defectiveness
and wrongfulness in terms of a general standard of reasonableness,
assessed with hindsight. Specific reference to a hindsight approach will
make it clear that producers, distributors and suppliers cannot evade
liability on the ground that the defect was not reasonably foreseeable at
the time of manufacture or supply.
There should be strict liability for the wrongful causing of harm by a
defective product, with provision for a non-exclusive list of factors that
could be taken into account by the courts in assessing defectiveness and
wrongfulness, in much the same way as section 61(3) and section 61(4) of
the Bill already provide for certain factors of this nature. Factors should
include:
. the standard intended for the product by the producer;
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. standards or duties prescribed by legislation for the product;
. the possible prevention of the harmful effect of the product by
alternative manufacturing process or design;
. the risk, benefit, utility and cost of the product;
. the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been
marketed, its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and
any instructions for, or warnings with respect to doing or refraining
from doing anything with or in relation to the product (section 61(3)(a)
contains a corresponding formulation);
. what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the
product (section 61(3)(b) contains a corresponding formulation); and
. the time when the product was manufactured or supplied (section
61(3)(c) contains a corresponding formulation).
Broadly stated, the assessment of defectiveness and wrongfulness in
terms of the factors just listed amounts to a cost-benefit-risk-utility
analysis, with a hindsight perspective, to establish whether the product
itself was unreasonably dangerous or the instructions or warnings
accompanying the product were unreasonably deficient. This approach
would be consistent with the current methodology of South African
courts in assessing wrongfulness. The respective weight to be attached to
the various listed factors in assessing defectiveness and wrongfulness will
be in the discretion of the court.
The adoption of a unitary standard for determining defectiveness is not
disputed (although it must be recognised that as currently drafted, that
standard is unsatisfactory). There should be no rigid distinction between
manufacturing, design and warning defects. The categorisation of defects
would introduce uncertainty, because the categories will inevitably
overlap.47 But in practice, notwithstanding a unitary standard for
defectiveness, different approaches are likely to be adopted according
to the type of alleged defect at issue, as was the American experience of
interpreting the Restatement (Second) of Torts.48 In respect of
manufacturing defects, the intended design and the operation of other
products of the same type is likely to carry the most weight, whereas in
relation to alleged design or warning defects, a cost-benefit-risk-utility
approach to assessing the design or warning is likely to be followed.
47 See, eg, Doornbult Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v Bayer South Africa (Edms) Bpk & Ciba-Geigy (Edms) Bpk
Case No I 5452/1976 (TPD) unreported, discussed by Van der Merwe & De Jager ‘‘Products Liability:
A Recent Unreported Case’’ 1980 SALJ 83 89-90. The product in issue was a herbicide harmful to the
plaintiff’s ‘‘waxy’’ maize (an exotic variety not officially registered as a seed variety in South Africa)
but not to registered varieties of maize. It could thus be regarded as suffering from a manufacturing
defect (it was intended to be safe for all varieties of maize but a feature of the manufacturing process
meant that it was damaging to some varieties); a design defect (it was designed to be safe for all
varieties of maize but a feature of its design meant that it was in fact damaging to some varieties); or a
warning defect (it was not intended to be safe for all varieties of maize and therefore required warnings
for use with exotic varieties).
48 See Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and
International Tort Law Common Law of Europe Casebooks (2000) par 6.3.4.
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As it stands, the Bill in one instance provides for an absence-of-
negligence defence, in the form of the ‘‘development risk defence’’. This
allows the defendant to raise the issue that the state of scientific and
technical knowledge did not allowdiscovery of the defect at the timewhen it
was under the defendant’s control. This exception to the general imposition
of strict liability is supported for reasons considered further below.
It is suggested that the linking of defectiveness and wrongfulness on the
basis of a general criterion of reasonableness, as outlined above, will
promote clarity, predictability and coherence in product liability cases,
not least because it fits into the existing structure of the law of delict and
utilises the well-developed concept of wrongfulness. This approach will
not, of course, remove all subjectivity from the assessment of defective-
ness and wrongfulness. As Stapleton49 has pointed out, in the application
of many a legal standard, reasonable minds can differ and the difference
cannot always be analysed definitively. Ultimately, the general reason-
ableness or cost-benefit-risk-utility analysis still requires a value
judgment, but there should be a structured methodology for arriving at
such a judgment.
5 4 Suggested amendments to section 71 and the definition of
‘‘defect’’ in section 1
For the reasons set out above it is suggested that the provisions on
strict liability for harm done by a defective product, as well as the
definition of ‘‘defect’’ in the Consumer Protection Bill should be
amended to read as follows (suggested deletions indicated by strike-
through and additions by italics):
Section 71(1):
‘‘‘Any producer, distributor or supplier of a good is strictly liable for any damage, as described
in subsection (2), caused wholly or partly as a consequence of a product failure, defect in the
good or hazard in a good, or as a result of inadequate instructions or warnings provided to the
consumer, whether or not there is intent or negligence on the part of the producer, distributor or
supplier; and if in a particular case more than one person is liable in terms of this subsection,
their liability is joint and several.’’
Section 1:
‘‘ ‘defect’ means any characteristic of a good, or component of a good, or aspect of a service
supplied to a customer, that renders the good, component, or service less useful, practicable or
safe than persons generally are entitled to expect, the causing of damage by the good wrongful,
having regard to all the circumstances of the transaction, subject to s. 58(4) and (5); including
but not limited to
a) the manner in which, and the purposes for which, that good has been marketed, packaged
and displayed, and any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining
from doing anything with or in relation to the good;
b) the use of any trade description or mark, any instructions for, or warnings with respect to
the use of that good;
c) the range of things that might reasonably be anticipated to be done with or in relation to
that good;
49 2000 39 Washburn LJ 363 376-378.
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the time when the good was manufactured and supplied;
d) the production standards intended for the good by the producer;
e) any production standards prescribed by legislation for the good;
f) any measures available to the producer for the prevention of the harmful effect of the good;
g) the possibility that the producer could reasonably have eliminated the harmful effect of the
good by alternative manufacturing process, design or otherwise, taking into account
factors such as the risk, benefit, utility and cost of the good;
h) what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the good.’’
6 Who is consumer?
The South African statute casts the net of consumer protection more
widely than the European model. While the Directive relates only to
products of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption and
used by the injured person mainly for private use or consumption,50 the
statute has no such exclusion — whether in relation to its provisions
generally or to the liability provisions specifically. Small businesses are
taken within the definition of consumer, since this may include juristic
persons, subject to separately determined upper limits on turnover and
the value of the particular transaction.51 In Europe, losses suffered to
commercial property are generally adequately insured and are of a very
different order from those to consumer property. Moreover, commercial
consumers normally have ready access to legal assistance in order to
pursue contractual and delictual claims. Since the same assumptions
cannot be made of small businesses in South African, their inclusion in
the framework of the statute is to be welcomed.
7 Who is liable?
Delictual liability does not arise at common law against a distributor of a
defective product—occupying an intermediate position in the supply chain
— unless it has in some way been at fault, as for example when it was
required to inspect the product and failed to detect the defect. In some
situations, however, the injured consumer is unable to identify the producer
of defective goods, and, leaving aside contractual remedies against the
seller, is therefore left without a remedy in delict. It is central, therefore, to a
strict liability regime that liability should be imposed upon others in the
supply chain as well as the ultimate producer of defective goods.
The strict liability provisions in section 71(1) thus apply to ‘‘any
producer, distributor or supplier’’, all terms as defined in section 1 of the
Act. ‘‘Supplier’’ in particular has a wide meaning, in that ‘‘supply. . .in-
cludes sell, lease, exchange, hire, or hire-purchase’’, as well as the
provision of services. Thus those who lease out goods such as cars are
liable in the same way as if the goods were manufactured by them.
However, it is not clear how by ‘‘hire-purchasing’’ goods one can in any
way be regarded as ‘‘supplying’’ them, although it is possible that the
50 Art 9.
51 S 5(2)(b).
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wording is intended to mean ‘‘enter into a hire-purchase agreement to
supply’’. One further difficulty is how this wording affects the common
triangular arrangement whereby a finance company buys goods from a
retailer in order to supply them to a customer on hire purchase. The UK
statute, for example, specifically removes the finance company from
liability in such a situation as an ‘‘ostensible supplier’’.52 The draft South
African wording, by contrast, would appear to leave it open that the
retailer might be regarded as a distributor in this context and the finance
company as the actual supplier (unless the latter can invoke the defence
under section 71(c) that it was unreasonable to expect that it should have
discovered the product defect). It must be questioned whether it was
intended so to extend strict product liability to credit providers.
Rather puzzlingly, section 1 also defines ‘‘importer’’ as one who brings
goods into the Republic of South Africa, and an implied warranty of
quality is imposed, inter alia upon importers by section 62. However,
section 71 does not expressly extend liability to this category, except in so
far as that party can be regarded as a distributor or supplier in any
event.53
The European Directive excludes liability from those who do not
produce goods for economic purposes or who manufacture or distribute
goods other than in the course of business.54 The exact extent of that
exclusion has not been entirely certain, and the question has arisen whether
the Directive applies to organisations which provide public services but are
regarded as operating a business that is commercial in character.55 Section
5(5) of the South African statute removes any doubt in this area by
specifically including suppliers who operate ‘‘on a for-profit basis or
otherwise’’. This has important implications in extending liability to public
organisations such as those providing health care and services. At the same
time, the definition of a ‘‘supplier’’ in section 1 as one who supplies goods
etcetera ‘‘in the ordinary course of business’’ would appear to exclude, for
example, individuals selling second-hand goods privately, and persons
from whom the defective goods have been stolen.
7 1 Joint and several liability of producers, distributors and suppliers
Section 71(1) of the Bill follows the American Restatement56 and, in
52 S 46(2).
53 Cf the European Directive which expressly extends the definition of producer and consequently
liability to include those who import goods into the EC from outside the Community (art 3(2)).
54 Art 7(c).
55 Eg, in Veedfald v A˚rhus Amtskommune Case (C203/99), 2001 ECR I-3569, 2003 1 CMLR 41, a hospital
run by the defendant health authority damaged a kidney while preparing it for transplant to the
claimant. The defendant argued that it was not liable under the Danish law transposing the Directive,
as the product had not been put into circulation or manufactured for an economic purpose. However,
it was held that the fact that the product was used for a publicly-funded medical service was not to
detract from the ‘‘economic and business character’’ of the enterprise.
56 } 1 imposes liability on ‘‘one who sells or otherwise distributes’’ a product; further defined in } 20 as
anyone who ‘‘transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or for resale’’.
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Europe, the corresponding provisions in the French Code Civil,57 in
imposing joint and several liability on all who participate in the retail
process, from the producer to the retailer. (This contrasts with the UK58
and Australia,59 for example, where suppliers and distributors become
liable in turn, all the way up the retail chain, only in so far as they cannot
identify from whom they obtained the goods.) The rationale for such
wide-ranging liability is clear: all who participate in marketing a defective
product contribute to the risk of harm. Distributors and retailers are thus
encouraged to put pressure on manufacturers to produce safe products;
and consumers who may not be able easily to identify the producer are
thereby offered a readily accessible choice of defendants to pursue.60 It
should be noted, however, that the South African statute does not also
provide expressly for a right of relief, for example, on the part of the
supplier who has been forced to pay up where goods were in fact already
defective when they left the producer. It is possible that the common law
may be regarded as allowing a right of relief in these circumstances, but it
is arguable that for the avoidance of doubt this right of relief should be
expressly stated (as, for example, in article 1386-8 of the French Code
Civil).
8 What kind of goods are included?
8 1 Land and buildings
The statute specifically includes in the definition of goods ‘‘an interest
in land or any other immovable property’’.61 (The Directive, in contrast,
includes only movables, although liability remains when a movable had
been attached to an immovable).62 Strictly construed, this brings within
the ambit of the legislation for example structural or design problems
causing buildings to be unsafe and hazards occurring on land sold by the
defendant. Since damage to the product itself — that is, the land or
buildings — would also appear to be recoverable,63 the cost of strict
liability claims in relation to transactions concerning immovables is
potentially daunting. It must be questioned whether this in fact represents
the legislative intention, especially given that many of those who stand to
benefit are not members of the social groups whom the legislation is
particularly designed to protect.
8 2 Information
The definition of ‘‘goods’’ also includes ‘‘any medium on which
57 Art 1386-8.
58 S 2(3).
59 Trade Practices Act 1974 s 75AJ.
60 See Reimann 2003 51 AmJCompL 764.
61 S 1.
62 Art 2.
63 See par infra.
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information is or may be written or encoded, and any thing written or
encoded on any such medium’’. It appears thus to include not only the
medium but also the information itself as a ‘‘good’’ for the purposes of
liability. In this respect the South African provisions cut through some of
the definitional issues raised by the European Directive in dealing with
defective information. Strict liability in Europe has traditionally been
regarded as focussed upon evaluation of a tangible end product rather
than intangible information.64 However, it is hard to justify the exclusion
of strict liability in the case of mass-produced informational products like
software packages, the distribution of which is analogous to other mass-
produced tangible products. There is no clear basis for a distinction
between the treatment of the producer of a defective plane, car or heart-
lung machine, and the producer of the defective software which has
caused such machinery to malfunction — arguably the latter should be
subjected to the same liability regime as the producer of any other
defective component part.65 Moreover, it would appear anomalous to
apply a different liability regime depending upon whether information
accompanying the product has rendered it dangerous or whether defective
information obtained from the product has instigated dangerous conduct
(for example a recipe contained in a cookery book which encourages the
use of poisonous mushrooms).66 Other transactions concerning intellec-
tual products such as computer programs may also involve both
information and tangible movable goods:67 for example, the production
of architectural or engineering plans in electronic format on disk can be
seen as the rendering of a service or the sale of a movable product, but, as
in the other cases above, the main focus is in fact upon the provision of
information.
At the same time, the possible consequences of admitting an open-
ended category of information to this strict liability regime should be
recognised. Strict liability for generally disseminated information, where
the information is not acquired by means of a particular consumer
transaction and where there is not necessarily any disparity in bargaining
power, raises the spectre of indeterminate liability and may also invade
the sphere of professional liability. The harmful consequences of
defective information can have a considerably wider reach than the
harm caused by defective tangible objects and it is therefore arguable that
liability for the former should be limited by negligence, because the threat
of strict liability could inhibit the socially and economically desirable free
dissemination of ideas and theories. In many cases a tangible object
incorporates the informational content, and the movable corporeal form
of the defective end product will suffice to create strict liability. While this
may have the effect of unfairly channelling liability to only one of the
64 See Stapleton Product Liability 330-331.
65 See Stapleton Product Liability 333-334.
66 Miller & Goldberg Product Liability 2 ed (2004) 322; Stapleton Product Liability 335.
67 See generally Miller & Goldberg Product Liability 320-333.
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parties responsible for a defective product — the producer of the end
product — in such a case the party who is strictly liable would usually be
in a better position than the end user to recover damages in turn, by
proving negligence (if it exists) on the part of the provider of the defective
information.
8 3 Blood and blood products
Given the open-ended definition of ‘‘goods’’ there would seem to be
little doubt that, as in Europe,68 it should extend to blood and blood
products, and that blood providers, in particular the South African
National Blood Service (SANBS), supplying such products for use in
publicly-funded hospitals and clinics, should be regarded as potentially
liable.69 Clearly the prevalence of HIV and AIDS in South Africa creates
special problems for the blood transfusion services. While in the 1980s
SANBS sustained a low infection rate, the risk of being infected with HIV
by screened blood escalated steadily throughout the 1990s and the risk is
now 25 times higher than in the USA.70 The effects of the introduction of
strict liability for contaminated blood must therefore be carefully
considered.
Currently the SANBS cannot be held liable for contaminated blood
unless the plaintiff proves all the elements of a delict, including the
wrongful causing of harm by the SANBS or a healthcare provider.71
Negligence on the part of the SANBS may take the form of failure to
screen or test the blood; failure to exclude a particular donor; failure to
comply with applicable legislation, regulations or Standards for Practice;
or that ‘‘the medical doctor who ordered the blood on behalf of the
patient did not exercise reasonable care and competence in the ordering
and administering of the blood’’.72 And in a recent interview,73 Professor
Anthon Heyns, the then CEO of the SANBS, stated that, because of the
strict quality guidelines that are followed in blood transfusion services,
68 See, eg, A v National Blood Authority 2001 3 All ER 289. This contrasts with the US where ‘‘blood
shield’’ laws have been passed in most States to the effect that blood and blood derivatives are not to
be treated as ‘‘products’’ for the purposes of product liability. For criticism of this protective regime,
see Conk ‘‘Is there a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability’’ 2000 109
Yale Law Journal 1087.
69 As one who ‘‘grows, nurtures, harvests, mines, generates, refines, creates or manufactures’’ the good (s
1 of the Bill). For a discussion of the applicability of the wording of the Directive and the UK
legislation to blood products, see Miller & Goldberg Product Liability par 9.68.
70 Van Wyk Liability for Blood Transfusion in South Africa available online at http://www.unisa.ac.za/
default.asp?Cmd ViewContent&ContentID 7009.
71 See Van Wyk Liability for Blood Transfusion in South Africa at http://www.unisa.ac.za/
default.asp?Cmd ViewContent&ContentID 7009. There are currently several pending cases in
South Africa including two civil claims against the Natal Transfusion Service.
72 Van Wyk Liability for Blood Transfusion in South Africa at http://www.unisa.ac.za/defaul-
t.asp?Cmd ViewContent&ContentID 7009.
73 Report by Hollemans inMail & Guardian 16 Dec 2004. This interview was in reaction to controversies
over the SANBS’ racial profiling system, according to which blood from black people is considered
most risky, and is only used when there is no other blood available (available online at http://
www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid 193804&area /ten questions/).
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‘‘it is almost impossible to prove that [the SANBS was] negligent, so [the
SANBS is] never going to be liable’’, although an alternative ground for
liability could be the failure to inform the blood recipient of all the
material risks inherent in the process of transfusion.74 The imposition of
strict (or stricter) product liability therefore has far-reaching conse-
quences for South African blood banks.
It must be acknowledged that without additional support, the SANBS,
a section 21 company, may struggle to cope with the additional burden of
claims which could potentially result from a strict liability regime.
Contaminated blood cases involve liability for general, special and
provisional damages, that is, ‘‘where the claimant, having established
liability, satisfies the court that there is a real danger of further injury
arising. Such awards enable the claimant to apply to the court for further
substantial damages should that further injury arise.’’75 The implications
are clearly illustrated by the Canadian experience. The Red Cross blood
bank was rendered insolvent by incurring liability for some $C8 billion. It
was subsequently replaced by a non-profit agency regulated by Canada’s
health department.76 The Government ultimately stepped in to pay
compensation to survivors who became infected by blood that had not
been screened for infectious diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis.
Consequently it has been argued that strict liability and its
concomitant risk of extensive damages awards against blood banks
may put their viability, and the availability of blood for transfusion, at
risk.77 However, as Eckert78 has noted:
‘‘Other industries continue to operate in spite of the higher costs that strict liability causes
whether they are competitive or monopolistic, for profit or not-for-profit. At any rate, the
purpose of a strict liability rule is not to minimize industry operating costs. Its purpose is to
strengthen the incentives of producers to compare the costs and benefits of precautions
whenever they have superior information about risk and to remove impediments to disclosing
useful information to consumers. The argument that blood banks cannot survive with strict
liability is tantamount to arguing that they cannot survive if consumers are fully informed
about transfusion risk.’’
Generally there is no clear policy justification for exempting non-for-
profit organisations from liability in respect of unsafe products.79
Hospitals, healthcare providers and patients depend on blood banks to
74 Van Wyk Liability for Blood Transfusion in South Africa at http://www.unisa.ac.za/defaul-
t.asp?Cmd ViewContent&ContentID 7009.
75 Best ‘‘A Comparison of Civil Liability for Defective Products in the United Kingdom and Germany’’
2002 3 German Law Journal no 4 par 14(b) available online at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/
article.php?id 144. In A v National Blood Authority 2001 3 All ER 289, because of the unpredictable
long term prognosis of hepatitis infected patients, Burton J awarded provisional damages in terms of
which if a claimant satisfied certain ‘‘trigger conditions’’ (sclerosis, liver disease, liver cancer or
psychiatric problems) at any time in his or her life, he or she could return to the court to obtain an
award of further damages.
76 See report by Tucker 13 Aug 1999: ‘‘Australian Schoolgirl Contracts HIV via Blood Transfusion’’ at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/aug1999/hiv-a13.shtml.
77 See Eckert ‘‘The AIDS-Blood Transfusion Cases: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Liability’’ 1992
29 San Diego Law Review 203 287 n 339.
78 1992 29 San Diego Law Review 203 288 (emphasis added).
79 Case C-203/99, Henning Veedfald v A˚rhus Amtskommune 2003 1 CMLR 41.
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provide uncontaminated blood. Providers of blood products have the
best available information and technology to avoid or contain risks.80
Moreover, as Eckert has also pointed out, consumers deal with doctors
and hospitals and often have little idea of the blood supplier or the safety
precautions it has adopted:
‘‘Consumers in general, when facing high information costs, are not likely even to know what
safety improvements such as additional screening or testing to bargain over. Patients rely
on their hospital to choose a suitable blood bank, their physician to inform them of risks, and
the blood bank to do its job prudently.’’81
The arguments in favour of strict liability for blood products are
therefore cogent — the risk of receiving HIV-contaminated blood in a
blood transfusion should not be borne by individual patients. At the
same time, the risks that strict liability entails for the SANBS should not
be disregarded, and a combination of insurance and State aid for the
service requires further investigation.
8 4 Pharmaceuticals
The broad definition of ‘‘good’’ would appear, in addition, to take in
defective pharmaceutical products. This is also consistent with the
European Directive. Indeed the impetus for reform of product liability in
Europe was partly derived from the problems which arose from the use of
the thalidomide drug by pregnant women in the 1950s and 1960s and its
subsequent link to the incidence of congenital defects in their babies. In
the debates which preceded the adoption of the Directive, the issues
surrounding pharmaceuticals attracted particular attention. However,
the inclusion of pharmaceuticals brings complex policy issues into the
balance. While there is understandable reluctance to allow consumers to
bear the development risk for unsafe drugs, there is also a view that the
liability regime should not be so strict as to discourage research into
important new products.82
In addition, liability for pharmaceuticals presents particular drafting
difficulties. The framework of liability must reckon with the problems of
establishing causation where substances may have been ingested some
time before the alleged defect comes to light, and this feature is further
considered in paragraph 10 below. But it must also be accepted that drugs
by their very nature are seldom completely safe, or else they could not be
effective. In determining which drugs are ‘‘defective’’, means must be
found to distinguish between those carrying risks that the public should
80 Eckert 1992 29 San Diego Law Review 245.
81 Eckert 1992 29 San Diego Law Review 243.
82 For a perspective from the pharmaceutical industry in Europe, see Response to Product Liability Green
Paper by European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) (1999) at
http://www.efpia.org/4 pos/legal/Prodliabilit .PDF. But see also Liability for Defective Products (Law
Com No 82, Scot Law Com No 45, 1977) par 60, in which the Law Commissions of England and
Wales and of Scotland, in a joint report, concluded that market forces provide a strong incentive to
develop drugs, whether or not strict liability is applied.
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not in any case accept, and those in which the important health
advantages outweigh the risks. Some jurisdictions have addressed such
difficulties by making specific provision for the pharmaceuticals. In the
United States, } 6 of the Third Restatement deals separately with liability
for harm caused by prescription drugs83 and medical devices. Within
Europe, the German Medicines Act of 1976, the Arzneimittelgesetz,
provides a separate liability regime in which, according to section 84,
‘‘pharmaceutical entrepreneurs’’ are liable if:
‘‘(a) when used in accordance with its intended purpose, the drug has harmful effects which
exceed the limits considered tolerable in the light of current medical knowledge and
which have their origin in the development or manufacturing process, or
(b) the harm has occurred as a result of labelling, expert information or instructions for use
which do not comply with current medical knowledge’’.84
Consumers are not required to establish fault, and they are further
assisted by a right of information by which they may require the
producer, or supervisory authority, to disclose knowledge on effects and
side-effects of the product in question (a right akin to the American pre-
trial discovery rules).85
Presumably such alternatives were considered but rejected in the
preparation of the draft South African legislation, and in this respect
South Africa will follow most of Europe, where arguments for special
treatment of pharmaceutical products have generally not prevailed.
Admittedly strict quality controls apply to the manufacture, importation
and distribution of prescription drugs.86 These involve the monitoring of
all stages of the manufacturing process and contain risks effectively in
most cases. The existence of such controls in Europe is perhaps one of the
factors by which the relatively low number of cases can be explained.
Nevertheless, as the Wagener case illustrates, instances of harm will
continue to occur. If the difficulties previously experienced by the
plaintiff in proving fault at common law are to be eased, close
consideration must be given to the appropriate balancing of factors in
defining defects in pharmaceuticals, and also to the interpretation of the
exclusion from liability provided by section 71(3)(c), as discussed further
below.
8 5 Defective components
Damage is compensated when it is caused ‘‘wholly or partly by a defect
as a consequence of a product failure, defect or hazard’’.87 It would seem
83 Based upon the assumption that governmental regulatory agencies adequately review new prescription
drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous designs off the market (} 6 comment b).
84 See also Best ‘‘A Comparison of Civil Liability for Defective Products in the United Kingdom and
Germany’’ 2002 3 German Law Journal no 4 at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.ph-
p?id 144, discussing proposed reforms to reverse the burden of proof in relation to causation.
85 See Magnus ‘‘The Reform of German Tort Law’’ at http://www.indret.com/rcs articulos/eng/127.pdf.
86 See in particular Medicines & Related Substances Act 101 of 1965.
87 S 71(1).
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uncontentious that a complex product is defective even where its
defectiveness is attributable only to a fault in one of its components:
for example, a car is defective even when only its brakes fail. At the same
time, the draft makes no express mention of how the defective component
is itself to be regarded, and in particular whether it is to be classed as a
‘‘good’’ in its own right. (This contrasts with the Directive which includes
all movables ‘‘even though incorporated into another movable or into an
immovable’’).88 This omission leaves a question mark over whether the
producer/supplier of a defective component which has caused a complex
product to fail may be found liable in terms of section 71, in addition to
the producer/supplier of the complex product which has been rendered
defective thereby. This appears to have been the draftsmen’s intention
since the draft statute provides that the producer of a component escapes
liability if it can show that the problem was caused by a defect in the
finished product rather than in the component;89 that the technical
specifications for the component set out by the producer of the finished
product were at fault;90 or that the component was compromised by
actions after being supplied by the producer/supplier.91 However, the
inclusion of components and raw materials in the definition of ‘‘good’’ in
section 1 would assist certainty.
9 What kind of damage is compensated?
The concept of defectiveness as set out in section 61 extends to those
features of a product which carry risk of personal injury or damage to
property.92 Section 71(2) imposes liability in relation to death and injury
and the loss or damage of ‘‘any property’’ as well as the economic loss
resulting therefrom.
This wording may therefore be interpreted as including damage to the
defective product itself and the economic loss deriving from its
replacement. To this extent the statute departs from the model of the
European Directive, which in article 9 defines damage similarly as
meaning ‘‘damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than
the defective product itself’’, and also from the US Third Restatement
(Product Liability) } 21 which covers ‘‘economic loss if caused by harm to
. . . the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself’’.93 Loss
may derive from the product itself in various ways — the costs of
replacement, repair or remedying a safety hazard. The wording of the
South African statute offers the owner significant additional opportunity
88 Art 2.
89 S 71(3)(b)(i).
90 S 71(3)(b)(ii).
91 S 71(3)(b)(iii).
92 S 61(4)(c)(ii).
93 On the policy justification for differentiating between damage to the product itself and damage to
other property, see Tettenborn ‘‘Components Product Liability: Damage to Other Property’’ 2000
LMCIQ 338 340-341.
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for compensation over and above the contractual remedies already
available when the product does not confirm to the contract description.
Moreover, in expressly compensating economic loss, the statute opens
up an important and potentially vast area of liability; for example a small
business (included as ‘‘consumer’’ under the statute) might suffer loss of
profits or loss of business reputation when a defective product used in its
undertaking has caused an accident.
10 Causation
The issue of causation is not dealt with expressly in the Bill. Section
71(1) states simply that producers etcetera are liable for damage ‘‘caused
wholly or partly as a consequence of’’ a product defect etcetera. Section
2(1) of the UK Statute similarly stipulates without qualification that
damage should be ‘‘caused’’ by a defect in a product, although the
Directive sets out in more detail that the injured person is ‘‘required to
prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect
and damage’’. Thus there is no requirement in the Bill to prove that the
particular defect was the exclusive or substantial cause, or to quantify the
extent of the causal connection as between different contributing
factors.94 Once the plaintiff has proved a material factual link between
the product defect and the harm suffered, therefore, the onus will
presumably pass to the defendant producer to establish either that the
product defect was not a material cause of the harm, or that the harm was
divisible and that the product defect was the cause of a quantifiable,
lesser part of it. However, in the first instance, the burden rests squarely
on the plaintiff to prove the causal link between defect and damage.
While in many cases it will be uncontroversial that the defect caused
the accident, in others, establishing causation creates an initial obstacle,
which the consumer struggles to surmount. The difficulty of proving
causation where proof rests on complex technical evidence was identified
in the European Commission’s Green Paper as one of the areas which
caused most concern to consumers in the implementation of the
European Directive.95 (In this, there would appear to be an imbalance
between the UK where, in the adversarial courtroom setting, the onus of
proof is a weighty one,96 and other European jurisdictions where the
94 Boberg The Law of Delict I (1984) 404-405; Humphrys NO v Barnes 2004 2 SA 577 (C); Kakamas
Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 2 SA 202 (A) per Schreiner JA 222A-C.
95 Commission of the European Communities Green Paper: Liability for Defective Products COM 99 396
par 3.2. It should also be noted that a report commissioned from the London law firm, Lovells, and
published in 2003 on the operation of the Directive did not conclude that the difficulties of proving
causation were resulting in injustice. The report identified the need for a product liability regime to
find the correct balance between the consumer and producer, and noted a ‘‘real concern’’ on the part
of producers and insurers that reducing the causal burden on the plaintiff might lead to an increase in
the number of spurious claims: Lovells Product Liability in the European Union: A Report for the
European Union (2003) 62 (http://www.lovells.com/Lovells/Services/Dispute+Resolution/Pro-
duct+Liability/Introduction.htm).
96 See, eg, Foster v Biosil 2000 59 Butterworths Medico-Legal Reports 178.
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judiciary may adopt a more inquisitorial role and where means may be
applied to ‘‘facilitate’’ the burden of proof, such as by inference of the
causal link or the application of presumptions). The difficulty is an
obvious one. Product liability cases are seldom fought across a level
playing field. In adducing evidence to establish causation, the individual
consumer may face an unequal struggle against the superior resources of
a large manufacturer with readier access to the necessary information.
Such problems of proof are exacerbated when the defective product has
itself perished or has been ingested (as with pharmaceuticals). Further
difficulties are found where the alleged defect is a defect in design, as
opposed to a straightforward manufacturing defect, or where the damage
is arguably caused by complex factors of which the product defect is only
one. The experience of other jurisdictions suggests the following
situations are worthy of comment.
10 1 Manufacturing defects
When a manufacturing defect in a product has apparently caused it to
fail in such a way as to cause harm and the product itself has been
damaged in the incident, the basic evidence required to establish factual
causation may not be easy to assemble. If the likely cause of direct
physical injury or property damage is a manufacturing defect, it would
seem reasonable to place the onus on the manufacturer to displace the
inference that this was indeed to blame. The paradigm of such cases is the
example of the bottle of carbonated drink which inexplicably explodes on
being handled, injuring the handler. Where the bottle was not accessible
to extraneous harmful forces and was carefully handled, and obvious
alternative causes can therefore be discounted, it may be inferred that the
explosion was caused by a defect in the bottle, even though the plaintiff
has not specifically eliminated every other possible cause.97 The drawing
of such an inference is consistent with practice in jurisdictions such as the
Netherlands98 and Belgium,99 where the court would infer that the glass
shattered due to a product defect, unless the producer can prove, for
example, that the defect was not present prior to the marketing of the
product; that the defect could not have been discovered at an earlier date;
or that the product was not used in accordance with its intended use.100
In a similar German case, the Bundesgerichtshof accepted that a bottle
had shattered due to a flaw in the glass, even though it was recognised
that the producer had in place the best possible equipment to detect
97 The classic US case is Escola v Coca Cola Bottling Co of Fresno 24 Cal 2d 453, 150 P 2d 436, CA 1944.
98 See Giesen & Loos ‘‘Liability for Defective Products and Services: The Netherlands’’ 2002 64
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law at http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-6.html, under reference to HR
24 December 1993, NJ 1994, 214 (Leebeek/Vrumona).
99 Riboux v SA Schweppes Belgium 21.11.96, Civ Namur ch 5, 1997 Revue de Jurisprudence de Lie`ge,
Mons et Bruxelles 104, cited by Lovells Product Liability in the European Union 64.
100 See Giesen & Loos 2002 64 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law at http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-
6.html; cf the English cases of Foster v Biosil 2000 59 Butterworths Medico-Legal Reports 178 and
Richardson v London Rubber Company 2001 59 Butterworths Medico-Legal Reports 185.
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possible blemishes in its bottles.101 This is also the approach adopted in }
3 of the US Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability. The
Restatement allows the inference to be drawn that the defect caused the
harm if the incident in question ‘‘was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a
result of product defect’’.
Given the stated aim of extending consumer confidence and
empowerment to groups with limited educational background, and the
experience of an extensive European and American case law, it is perhaps
curious that no further refinement has been made to the wording of the
South African Bill in this regard. An option for consideration, following
on from the models in these other jurisdictions, is whether section 71(1)
might be extended to allow a dual inference to be drawn where an
incident is of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of a manufacturing
defect of this sort, such as an exploding bottle, or, for example, and
electrical apparatus which explodes.102 First, the existence of the defect
will be inferred, and this in turn allows the inference of a causal link
between the defect and the damage suffered by the plaintiff. At the same
time, it is open to the producer to disprove that causal link by providing
evidence of causation in relation to other factors — that the harm was
solely the result of causes other than the defect in the product. The
defendant producer may also escape liability by offering one of the
defences provided in section 71(3) — for instance that the defect did not
exist in the product at the time that it supplied it, or, where the defect has
occurred in a complex product for which the defendant producer supplied
a component part only, that the defect was attributable to a later product
into which the producer’s product was incorporated. Such amendment
might be worded as follows:
‘‘It may be inferred that there was a defect in the product, and that defect was a material cause
of the damage suffered by the plaintiff, without proof of the specific defect, when the damage
suffered
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect; and
(b) was not solely the result of causes other than the product defect.’’
In effect, this statutory wording would do the work of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine in the Aquilian action, as previously accepted in relation
to products cases.103
101 BGH 129 353, NJW 1995 2162 Weir (transl) available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global law/
german-cases/cases bundes.shtml?09may1995.
102 The examples offered by the ALI commentators to illustrate } 3 of the Third Restatement include a
collapsing driver’s seat in a car and a power tool from which one of the parts flies out.
103 See, eg, Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1990 2 SA 647 per Milne JA 661, referring to the
policy considerations discussed in Boberg The Law of Delict I 195 et seq.
104 See, eg, Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd 1936 AC 85 in which the plaintiff suffered dermatitis
after wearing underwear made from yarn containing a chemical irritant; TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz
2004 3 Singapore Law Reports 543 in which the plaintiff suffered liver failure after taking a course of
slimming pills.
442 STELL LR 2006 3
10 2 Defects giving rise to non-traumatic injury
Issues of factual causation raise substantial difficulties where the
alleged harm is not a direct injury but a medical condition, involving, for
example, cardiovascular damage, allegedly caused by ingestion of a
particular substance, typically a pharmaceutical. Where an otherwise
healthy individual has been exposed to a particular substance it may be
possible to exclude other factors and lead sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove causation on the balance of probabilities.104 However,
the plaintiff is typically required to reckon with the possible causative
impact of environmental factors and the underlying medical condition, as
well as that of the substance itself. Determining factual causation thus
involves scrutiny of complex, highly technical evidence and a heavy
evidential burden is placed upon the consumer with regard to the
evaluation of epidemiological evidence. The problem even with the most
extensive epidemiological investigation is that it may raise as many
questions as it answers. As Stapleton105 has pointed out, and as the
examples above show, such data typically ‘‘cannot be sufficiently focused
to eliminate related factors’’. If other environmental factors create a
background risk that the condition might arise in any event and this
differs little from the risk attributed to the product, it may prove
impossible to establish causation on the balance of probabilities.106 The
difficulty of reducing competing explanations for non-traumatic injury
arises, no matter whether pharmaceuticals or other substances are alleged
to be the cause.107 A recent English case offers an illustration: in XYZ v
Schering Health Care Ltd,108 a group of claimants brought a claim under
the UK Consumer Protection Act 1987 against manufacturers of oral
contraceptives, alleging that the drugs were defective in that they had
exposed them to an increased risk of cardiovascular injury. All of the
claimants had suffered health problems, such as strokes, deep-vein
thrombosis and pulmonary embolisms, a short time after being
prescribed the defendants’ products. A large volume of epidemiological
evidence was laid before the court by both sides, including studies by the
World Health Organisation, three major transnational studies, and
diverging analyses, produced by two eminent medical experts, of data
105 Product Liability 281.
106 For a discussion, see Stapleton Product Liability 283-287.
107 See, eg, the English case of AB v John Wyeth and Brother Ltd No 4 1994 PIQR P109 116-117,
involving alleged injury caused by benzodiazepine drugs, in which Stuart-Smith LJ addressed ‘‘very
considerable problems on causation: these involve distinguishing between the effects of the drug and
the underlying condition for which it was prescribed, the problems caused by previous addiction to
benzodiazapine drugs other than those prescribed by the defendants, and distinguishing between
symptoms due to the drugs or, in some cases, other drugs or excess alcohol, and the fact that many
plaintiffs may suffer at least some withdrawal symptoms in any event’’.
108 2002 70 Butterworths Medico-Legal Reports 88. See also Vadera v Shaw 1999 45 Butterworths
Medico-Legal Reports 162; Goldberg ‘‘The Contraceptive Pill, Negligence and Causation: Views on
Vadera v Shaw’’ 2000 8 Med L Rev 316.
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extracted from the UK General Practice Research Database.109 In a
highly detailed judgment extending to 345 paragraphs, Mr Justice
MacKay (sitting alone in the Queen’s Bench Division) praised the
expertise with which the claimants’ case had been presented. However,
their case failed. Despite its length, his judgment contained only short
passages of legal analysis, but it evaluated in extensive and meticulous
detail the risk factor as indicated by the various scientific studies. On the
balance of probabilities, he was not satisfied that this evidence established
an increase in the risk factor of the order alleged by the claimants. The
case therefore failed at the first hurdle of proving factual causation.110
The issue raised by product liability cases is therefore whether it is
acceptable to place the burden of evidential uncertainty so squarely upon
the plaintiff, given that the producer ‘‘may have better access to the
evidence or at least better options to control the consequences of
incertitude’’.111 However, recent discussion in Europe has not pointed to
a more consumer-oriented means of determining causation in such cases.
A report by the London law firm of Lovells112 on the working of the
European Directive concluded that the balance between manufacturer
and consumer would not be served by easing the evidential burden on the
latter in such cases. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations, unsurprisingly, also argued against conces-
sions being made to the consumer. The EFPIA’s main concern was that
easing the burden of proof for causation would encourage an increase in
speculative claims and lead to increased costs for the industry (given that
even the defence of unsuccessful claims involves substantial costs which
are not always recoverable). It concluded that such a change would
‘‘divert scarce industry resources from innovation, adversely affect
competitiveness and reduce the availability of insurance cover’’.113
Even in those jurisdictions which have made specific provision with
regard to injuries allegedly caused by pharmaceuticals, the burden of
proof in causation typically remains squarely with the plaintiff. The US
Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability provides in } 6 that
pharmaceutical manufacturers are ‘‘subject to liability for harm to
persons caused by the defect’’ in the drug or pharmaceutical device, but
no further concessions are made as to how causation may be established.
Similarly, the German Pharmaceuticals statute, the Arzneimittelgesetz,
which places strict liability on the producers of pharmaceuticals, allows
liability to be found only when injury is the result of ingestion of the drug,
and the effects have their origin in the development of the manufacturing
109 In the Fourth Appendix to MacKay J’s judgment, 56 separate sources of epidemiological data are
listed.
110 For a further striking example of the difficulties of determining factual causation in relation to
whether smoking was the cause of lung cancer, see McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd 2005 2 SC 1.
111 Reimann 2003 51 AmJCompL 772.
112 Product Liability in the European Union.
113 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations Position Paper: Green Paper on
Liability for Defective Products (1999) par 8.1.
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process or is the result of labelling or instructions defects.114 To this
extent, therefore, although proof of fault is not required, it remains for
the claimant to prove that the harm has been caused by the defect.
The South African Bill likewise makes no concession to the plaintiff by
shifting the burden of proof in relation to pharmaceuticals. No doubt this
follows on due consideration of the implications of an alternative
wording for the pharmaceutical industry and their consequences in terms
of the costs of existing products and the possible disincentive to research
and development. This means, however, that certain groups of consumers
who suffer harm due to defective pharmaceuticals are effectively excluded
from the strict liability compensation by the difficulties of establishing
causation.
10 3 Warnings issued with the product
Some products, for example power-driven chainsaws, are unavoidably
dangerous, but their utility to the consumer means that they must
continue to be sold. In determining whether a product is defective, section
61(3)(a) therefore takes account of the instructions or warnings issued
with the product. A product escapes the definition of defective if it is
accompanied by warnings proportionate to the risk it represents, and/or
adequate instructions for its safe use. Thus the ultimate responsibility for
accident prevention is in practice placed upon the consumer.
In order to fix liability on the producer, the draft statute requires the
defect to have caused the damage. This means that in cases where the
alleged basis of defectiveness is deficient or absent instructions, it must be
shown that this deficiency caused the harm. In principle, therefore, the
plaintiff must establish: first, that a more appropriate warning could have
been provided; secondly, that such a warning would have been observed;
and thirdly, that adhering to the warning would have prevented the
harm.115
The second of these elements in particular is potentially problematic in
that it shifts the focus away from the product itself and on to the
significance of consumer action or inaction. The difficulty is of course
that consumer response is infinitely variable — even literate and educated
consumers can be surprisingly inattentive to warnings.116 In order to
assist in establishing what the consumer’s hypothetical response would
have been, and to strike a fair balance between expectations of producer
114 S 84.
115 See Bowbeer, Lumish & Cohen ‘‘Warning! Failure to Read this Article may be Hazardous to your
Failure to Warn Defense’’ 2000 27WmMitchell L Rev 439 444. See also the Scots case ofMcWilliams
v Sir William Arrol and Co 1962 SC (HL) 70, in which the pursuer’s husband was killed in a fall. The
court accepted that his employers were at fault in not providing him with a safety harness, but also
accepted the inference that deceased would not have worn such a harness if provided. The case
against the employers was therefore unsuccessful as the pursuer had proved the breach of duty, but
not the causal connection between the breach of duty and the accident.
116 For a general discussion, see Bowbeer et al 2000 27WmMitchell L Rev 439; Latin ‘‘‘Good’ Warnings,
Bad Products and Cognitive Limitations’’ 1994 41 UCLA L Rev 1193.
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and consumer, two rebuttable inferences may legitimately be drawn from
this wording.117 The first118 is that where warning is given, the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded. The second follows
from the first: if no warning has been given, it may be similarly assumed
that a warning, had it been present, would have been read and heeded.
These are rebuttable presumptions only. Courts in some US jurisdic-
tions, for example, have accepted evidence that individual smokers would
not have heeded health warnings on cigarette packets.119 The presump-
tion must be applied in such a way as to take account of likely consumers.
Thus in the South African market, the presumption might be rebutted,
for example, if instructions in complex technical jargon accompanied a
product known to be widely marketed in rural areas where literacy rates
were uneven.
11 Defences: the ‘‘development risk’’ defence
The wording of section 71(3) of the Bill in providing for defences
closely follows that of section 4 of the UK Consumer Protection Act.
There is no liability if the defect is the result of compliance with public
regulations, or if the defect did not exist in the good at the time it was
supplied (for example, when a sound component has been made defective
by inept attachment to a complex product, or was made to faulty
specifications). However, the Bill also includes a version of what has
come to be known in Europe as ‘‘the development risks’’ defence,
although the wording does not entirely follow either the Directive model
(article 7(e)) or the UK statute (section 4(1)(e)).
There is no liability if, in terms of section 71(3)(c), it is ‘‘unreasonable’’
to expect the ‘‘distributor or supplier’’ to have discovered the defect,
having regard to the ‘‘person’s role in introducing the good to the
consumer market; and the state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time the good was under the control of that person’’. This exemption
from liability is broadly drafted. The European counterpart of this
‘‘development risk’’ defence is significantly narrower, exempting the
producer only where it was not possible for it to have known of the defect
(the state of knowledge ‘‘was not such as to enable the existence of the
defect to be discovered’’). Yet the latter is one of the most controversial
features of the Directive, in that, as Stapleton and others have argued, it
may be regarded as readmitting fault-based liability through the back
door. In effect, it has been regarded as allowing the producer/supplier to
escape supposedly ‘‘strict’’ liability by establishing that it was not at fault
with regard to establishing latent risk. The inclusion of this defence in the
European Directive was the result of pressure from the commercial lobby
117 See discussion in Miller & Goldberg Product Liability 474-475.
118 Deriving from comment j to } 402A of the US Restatement (Second) of Torts.
119 Viguers v Philip Morris USA Inc 837 A 2d 534 (Pa Super 2003), aff’d 2005 Pa LEXIS 2127; Goldstein v
Philip Morris Inc 854 A 2d 585 (Pa Super 2004).
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and, notably, from the UK Government led at that time by Margaret
Thatcher, which feared the impact of a strict liability regime on
innovative industries.120 The defence has been frequently invoked by
producers in subsequent litigation, although not always successfully.
Section 71(3)(c) of the Bill, on the other hand, appears to allow producers
even more latitude in assessing merely what was reasonable for ‘‘the
distributor or supplier’’ to know, rather than what was possible. Its
wording may reflect a policy decision to make a similar concession to
South African businesses. Whatever the reason for its inclusion, it must
be recognised that, as currently drafted, this provision opens up a
significant gap in supposedly ‘‘strict’’ liability for those distributors and
suppliers who can persuade the court that they have acted reasonably. In
assessing this, a subjective rather than an objective standpoint is adopted,
taking account of ‘‘that person’s role in introducing the good to the
market’’. If such a person can escape liability where it has exercised
reasonable care, it is doubtful whether the liability regime can be
described as strict, since liability is accurately termed as strict only when
it imposes liability for foreseeable and unforeseeable risks.121
There is, however, an even more pressing technical problem with this
subsection as currently worded. Section 71(3) provides that ‘‘[l]iability of
a particular person . . . does not arise in any of the following
circumstances. . .’’. In other words, it offers exemption from liability to
any persons identified in the section as otherwise liable (producers,
distributors and suppliers). Section 71(3)(c) then provides an exemption
when ‘‘it is unreasonable to expect the distributor or supplier to have
discovered the product failure’’, but does not mention producers. On a
literal reading of this section, the combined effect is therefore to exempt
producers from liability, even if it would have been reasonable for the
producer to have discovered the defect, but where it was unreasonable for
the distributor or supplier to have discovered it. It must be questioned
whether this was the intended effect of the section. It is not clear whether
the intention was to extend the defence to producers but only when it was
unreasonable to expect producers to have known of the defect; or to
exclude producers from the defence altogether. Either way, amendment is
essential to clarify its scope.
11 1 Accessibility of knowledge
A further subsidiary point concerning the interpretation of section
71(3)(c) is that the precise scope of ‘‘the state of scientific and technical
knowledge’’ is open to interpretation. When does a research hypothesis
about a product’s performance convert into accepted ‘‘knowledge’’: is
any particular endorsement required? And how widely should knowledge
120 Miller & Goldberg Product Liability par 13.25.
121 On this point see Stapleton ‘‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, and Anglo-Australian
Perspective’’ 2000 39 Washburn LJ 363 369.
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be known before the distributors and suppliers are expected to discover
it? Tesauro, the European Advocate General, stated in one case122 that
relevant factors to be considered with regard to article 7(e) of the
Directive include the ‘‘place of origin [of information], the language in
which it is given and the circulation of the journals in which it is
published’’. In particular, he noted ‘‘major differences in point of the
speed in which it gets into circulation and the scale of its dissemination
between a study of a researcher in a university in the United States
published in an international English-language international journal and,
to take an example given by the Commission, similar research carried out
by an academic in Manchuria published in a local scientific journal in
Chinese, which does not go outside the boundaries of the region’’. ‘‘State
of knowledge’’ should therefore encompass ‘‘all data in the information
circuit of the scientific community as a whole, bearing in mind, however,
on the basis of a reasonableness test the actual opportunities for the
information to circulate’’. This interpretation has elicited the following
observation by Burton J in the leading English case of A v National Blood
Authority:123
‘‘It is not entirely clear what in practice is meant by the ‘Manchuria exception’. . .[I]f in fact the
product in question were a product for which Manchuria was renowned, perhaps yoghurt or
fabric, then Manchuria itself would be a bad example: if however it were a product of
particularly high technology then it might well be wholly unlikely that Manchuria would have
thought something up. It seems to me that the right approach is to look at ‘accessibility’ and to
regard as Manchuria perhaps an unpublished document or unpublished research not available
to the general public, retained within the laboratory or research department of a particular
company.’’
The use of ‘‘a reasonableness test’’, however, opens a further point of
entry for the terminology of fault. In taking into account the producer’s
conduct, and removing liability for risks which were not foreseeable, the
defence exculpates producers who establish that they were not negligent
in this way. The defence thus brings the ‘‘strict’’ liability of the Directive
more or less in line with Aquilian liability in which the duty to take into
account the most recent knowledge available in his field is built into the
formulation of the manufacturer’s general duty towards the consumer.
Further qualification is therefore required as follows.
11 2 Time of assessment: with or without hindsight
Under the negligence standard, factors indicating an unreasonably
dangerous product are evaluated at the time of manufacture — the
manufacturer’s culpability is evaluated, without hindsight, on the
knowledge available to it at the time of manufacture/distribution. In a
similar fashion article 7(e) of the European Directive provides for an
122 Case C-300/95 Commission v UK 1997 ECR I-2649, 1997 3 CMLR 923 pars 23-24.
123 2001 3 All ER 289 par 24.
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assessment of the state of scientific and technical knowledge when the
product is put into circulation.
It should be noted, however, that an alternative approach is possible. If
a product liability regime evaluates ‘‘development risks’’ with hindsight
— that is to say the risks are evaluated as known at the time of trial — it
draws closer to strict (no-fault) liability. In the US, the so-called Keeton-
Wade view adopted a form of hindsight analysis by imputing knowledge
of risks to the producer at the time of manufacture or sale. Therefore in
cases of design flaws or of failure to warn of a danger, factors that fell to
be considered included:
‘‘hazards that were unknown, or even unknowable, to the manufacturer when the product was
marketed. That the manufacturer could not have discovered these risks in the exercise of
reasonable care would be irrelevant; if a hypothetical reasonable manufacturer, aware of these
risks, would not have marketed the product or would have warned of the dangers, an injured
plaintiff may recover.
This exception uses hindsight to achieve a genuine strict liability in certain cases of generic
risks, such as adverse reactions to drugs, dusts, and chemicals. This hindsight approach,
however, has not received much policy-oriented justification either by courts or commenta-
tors.’’124
This alternative approach ties in with the approach to wrongfulness
and the existence of a defect as set out under paragraph 4 of this article.
This envisages a comprehensive assessment of reasonableness with the
perspective of hindsight, by taking account of all later-known facts
pertaining to the cost, risk and utility of the product. Thus producers
would not be permitted to evade liability on the ground that the defect
was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of manufacture or supply, if,
at the time of the trial, the risk has become known and, with such
knowledge, it would have been reasonably possible to avoid the risk. In
such a way the burden of the cost of development risks is lifted from the
consumer to the producer.125 However, this alternative approach would
severely limit the application of the development risk defence.
A third intermediate approach is also possible. This would entail a
focus, with hindsight, on the highest level of knowledge reasonably
accessible, at the time the good was under the control of the distributor,
supplier or producer (if the defence is regarded as extending to
producers), to a distributor, supplier or producer of products of the
same description, applying the best-known and economically feasible
practices. This would raise the bar for application of the defence — it
would not be available on the basis of possible informational or
organisational constraints under which the particular defendant oper-
ated.126 In view of the policy considerations underlying the introduction
of strict liability for defective products it seems appropriate to set a high,
but not unattainable, standard for reliance on the development risk
124 Page ‘‘Generic Product Risks: The Case against Comment k and for Strict Liability’’ 1983 58 NYU
LRev 853 876-877.
125 On this point, see Stapleton Product Liability 244.
126 See discussion in Miller & Goldberg Product Liability pars 13.89-13.90.
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defence. The defendant should not be able to rely on mere absence of
negligence where scientific and technical knowledge is concerned. Thus in
our view the standard should be the highest level of knowledge
reasonably accessible to suppliers of the kind concerned, by application
of the best-known and economically feasible practices.
It is for the legislature to consider the policy implications of different
approaches to the evaluation of development risks. While it is important
to ensure appropriate redress for injured consumers, it is no doubt also
necessary to take into account the broader implications for a developing
economy of adopting a regime which disincentivises research and
development, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector. The latter rather
than the former consideration appears to have been foremost when
section 71(3) of the Bill was drafted.
11 3 Undetectable defects
In principle, the development risk defence is not available where the
defect stems from the product’s disconformity with the manufacturer’s
design. It is inapplicable even where the defect has arisen because the
state of scientific and technical research is such that an infallible quality
control system is not attainable.127 In the German Supreme Court, this
argument was raised when a hairline fracture caused a re-usable mineral
water bottle to explode.128 Although the fracture was considered a visual
flaw, it was undetectable either visually or through state of the art
inspection machinery. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decided that the
development risk defence did not cover straightforward manufacturing
errors which were unknown and undetectable.
A further question arises whether the defence applies to defects the
presence of which is known in principle, but which, given scientific and
technical knowledge at the time, cannot be detected in any given sample
of the product. The English case of A v National Blood Authority129
illustrates. The case involved claims by persons who had contracted
hepatitis C after receiving transfusions of infected blood. At the time of
transfusion the presence of the virus had been identified, but no
satisfactory screen test existed to eliminate it from blood donations
prior to their use. The defendants argued that the development risks
defence as contained in section 4(1)(e) of the UK Consumer Protection
Act 1987 could be used, even though the existence of the defect was
known to the medical profession and blood producers, since the then
state of knowledge was not such as to enable a producer to discover the
existence of the defect in the particular blood product used. However, this
was rejected on the basis that once the existence of contamination is
127 Grubb (series ed) Howells (gen ed) Butterworths Common Law Series: The Law of Product Liability
(2000) par 4.249; Miller & Goldberg Product Liability par 13.91.
128 1995 NJW 2162.
129 2001 3 All ER 289 par 8.
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known, even if not discoverable in any given sample, it was a known risk.
A known, but unavoidable, risk was not to be regarded as falling within
the development risk defence.130 Burton J held that:
‘‘If there is a known risk . . . then the producer continues to produce and supply at his own
risk. It would, in my judgment, be inconsistent with the purpose of the Directive if a producer,
in the case of a known risk, continues to supply products simply because, and despite the fact
that, he is unable to identify in which if any of his products that defect will occur or recur, or,
more relevantly in a case such as this, where the producer is obliged to supply, continues to
supply without accepting the responsibility for any injuries resulting, by insurance or
otherwise. . . The existence of the defect is in my judgment clearly generic.’’131
It would seem to follow therefore from the framework proposed in the
Bill that once a defect is within the realm of scientific and technical
knowledge, the section 71(3)(c) exclusion from liability disappears, and
the burden of failure to introduce effective screening procedures falls
upon the distributor or supplier (or producer if the defence is regarded as
extending to it).
12 Prescription
There is no liability if claims are brought after three years have elapsed.
However, section 71(3)(d) of the Bill leaves a number of question marks
as to the exact starting point for that period. Three alternatives are
mentioned: the ‘‘death or injury of a person’’; ‘‘the earliest time at which
a person with an interest in any property had knowledge of the material
facts about the loss or damage to that property’’; or ‘‘the latest date on
which a person suffered any economic loss’’. But the wording does not
clarify which is to prevail in the case where more than one is applicable.
A more serious problem is that this extremely loose wording quite
simply does not tie in with the rest of section 71. In referring to ‘‘any
person’’ and ‘‘any property’’ this subsection makes no stipulation as to
what sort of ‘‘person’’ should have been injured or in what circumstances,
or how ‘‘property’’ should have been lost, damaged, or occasioned
economic loss.
For comparison purposes, section 22B, concerning product liability, of
the Scots Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 may be
considered:
‘‘(2) Subject to subsection (4) below, an action to which this section applies shall not be
competent unless it is commenced within the period of 3 years after the earliest date on
which the person seeking to bring (or a person who could at an earlier date have brought)
the action was aware, or on which, in the opinion of the court, it was reasonably
practicable for him in all the circumstances to become aware, of all the facts mentioned in
subsection (3) below.
(3) The facts referred to in subsection (2) above are
(a) that there was a defect in a product;
(b) that the damage was caused or partly caused by the defect;
(c) that the damage was sufficiently serious to justify the pursuer (or other person
130 A v National Blood Authority 2001 3 All ER 289 par 31-32 50.
131 A v National Blood Authority 2001 3 All ER 289 par 74.
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referred to in subsection (2) above) in bringing an action to which this section applies
on the assumption that the defender did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a
decree;
(d) that the defender was a person liable for the damage under the said section 2.
(4) In the computation of the period of 3 years mentioned in subsection (2) above, there shall
be disregarded any period during which the person seeking to bring the action was under
legal disability by reason of nonage or unsoundness of mind.’’
13 Contributory negligence?
One final observation is that the Bill makes no provision for
contributory negligence. This is logical in a statute providing for strict
liability. It is impossible to measure the relative contribution made by
negligence on the part of the plaintiff as compared with the defendant’s
conduct, when the latter, notionally at least, is not being assessed in such
terms. However, it is arguable that there should be some recognition of
the contribution made by the plaintiff to his or her loss where due care
has not been observed. For example, section 61(4)(a) provides that the
latent or patent nature of defect is irrelevant. Without provision for
contributory negligence, this would appear to mean that even the most
patent defects can be ignored by consumers with no penalty (although a
plaintiff who had failed to observe perfectly obvious warnings or who
had put the product to unusual and unanticipated use would be likely to
find that the product did not meet the definition of defective as set out in
section 61(3)). In this regard the wording of section 75AN(1) of the
Australian Trade Practice Act 1974 might be considered a helpful
comparator:
‘‘If the loss in a liability action under section 75AD or 75AE was caused by both:
(a) an act or omission of the individual who suffers the injuries concerned; and
(b) a defect of the action goods;
the amount of the loss is to be reduced to such extent (which may be to nil) as the court thinks
fit having regard to that individual’s share in causing the loss.’’
14 Conclusion
The introduction of strict products liability in the Consumer Protection
Bill is to be welcomed as an indispensable element in South Africa’s new
consumer law. However, as currently drafted, the Bill leaves open a
number of significant uncertainties for the consumer seeking redress from
producers and suppliers of defective products. These relate in particular
to the core definition of defectiveness; the ‘‘development risk’’ defence
permitted where the defect was unknowable; and the burden of proving
causation. It is to be hoped that attention will be now be given to these
problem areas, in order that the legislation in its final form will indeed
establish an ‘‘accessible, consistent, harmonized, effective and efficient
system of redress for consumers’’.132
132 S 3 of the Bill.
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OPSOMMING
Die Verbruikersbeskermingswetsontwerp 2006 maak voorsiening vir skuldlose aanspreeklik-
heid van vervaardigers en andere teenoor verbruikers van defekte produkte. Tot op hede is
aanspreeklikheid vir skade weens defekte produkte gegrond op skuld, meestal nalatigheid. In
Wagener and Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) was die Hoogste Hof van Appe`l
nie bereid om af te wyk van die skuldgrondslag vir hierdie soort aanspreeklikheid nie in die
uitspraak is geso˜ dat ree¨ls ten opsigte van skuldlose aanspreeklikheid vir defekte produkte deur die
wetgewer geskep sal moet word. Hierdie Wetsontwerp skep nou sulke ree¨ls, soortgelyk aan reSˇls
wat reeds in talle ander regstelsels geld. Prominente voorbeelde van sulke ree¨ls is te vinde in die
Amerikaanse Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability en die Europese riglyne vir produkte-
aanspreeklikheid van 1985, wat tot die aanname van ooreenstemmende wetgewing in al die
Europese lidlande gelei het. Die Verbruikersbeskermingswetsontwerp volg in ’n groot mate die
Europese model, in besonder die Consumer Protection Act 1987 van die Verenigde Koninkryk.
In hierdie artikel word aangevoer dat ’n stelsel van skuldlose aanspreeklikheid vir defekte
produkte in Suid-Afrika om beleidsredes geregverdig is, maar dat die Europese model nie as ’n
ongekwalifiseerde sukses ervaar is nie en dat die onkritiese navolging van hierdie model sekere
onduidelikhede skep; en dat die beoogde ree¨ls in sekere opsigte nie goed aanpas by die beginsels
van die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg nie. Besondere vrae wat vanuit hierdie perspektief bespreek
word, sluit in die volgende: Ten opsigte van watter produkte in die Wetsontwerp genoem
‘‘goods’’ - moet skuldlose aanspreeklikheid erken word (ook vir defekte in grond en gebrekkige
inligting?); wanneer moet ’n produk as ‘‘defek’’ beskou word (is die maatstaf van verbruikers-
verwagtinge ‘‘consumer expectations’’ ’n geskikte een en is dit versoenbaar met die
onregmatigheidsvereiste vir deliktuele aanspreeklikheid?); wie moet as verweerders teenoor die
verbruikers van ’n defekte produk aanspreeklik wees (vervaardigers, verspreiders en ook andere?);
vir watter soort skade moet aanspreeklikheid erken word (moet buiten vergoeding vir saakskade
en liggaamlike besering ook ekonomiese verlies vergoed word?); watter verwere moet vir die
vervaardiger of verspreider beskikbaar wees (ook die sogenaamde ontwikkelingsrisikoverweer
‘‘development risk defence’’?); en vrae oor spesiale ree¨ls vir kousaliteit en verjaring.
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